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AUTHORITY

AGO D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
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IN REPLY REFER TO  
AGAM-P (M) (17 Apr 67) FOR OT

19 April 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 124th Transportation Terminal Command

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Forwarded as inclosure is Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 124th Transportation Terminal Command for quarterly period ending 31 January 1967. Information contained in this report should be reviewed and evaluated by CDC in accordance with paragraph 6f of AR 1-19 and by CONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d of AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to the Commandants of the Service Schools to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

*Kenneth G. Wickham*

KENNETH G. WICKHAM  
Major General, USA  
The Adjutant General

1 Incl  
as

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
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
CAM RANH BAY PORT  
124TH TRANSPORTATION TERMINAL COMMAND  
APO 96312

AVCA CR-P-2

10 February 1967


SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967  
(RCS CSFOR-65)

THRU: Commanding General  
US Army Support Command, Cam Ranh Bay  
APO 96312

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development  
Department of the Army  
Washington, D.C. 20310

The inclosed report is submitted in compliance with 1st Logistical  
Command Regulation 870-2, as changed.

1 Incl (dupe)  
as

  
ROBERT D. REID  
Colonel, TC  
Commanding

Inclosure 1

OPERATIONAL REPORT FOR QUARTERLY PERIOD ENDING 31 JANUARY 1967

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SECTION I (SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATION OR UNIT ACTIVITIES)

1. This report covers the period 1 November through 31 January 1967. All 92 days of the period were spent in operations. Mandatory training required by US Army Support Command Regulation 350-2 and OJT were conducted.

2. On 21 November 1966 the Port Commander was medically evacuated to CONUS. The Command then operated under the direction of an acting Commander for 51 days until 10 January 1967, when 1st Logistical Command assigned another officer from within its resources. During the month of January all personnel records and personnel staff sections were transferred to a centralized Personnel Service Center, thereby eliminating all organic personnel slots with the exception of one personnel sergeant and a personnel clerk.

3. On 5 November 1966 the first ship was berthed at the new ammunition pier. This pier is located approximately 2500 meters north of the main pier complex, which allows for the safe discharge of two ammunition ships simultaneously. The use of this pier as the principal ammunition discharge facility decreased reliance on a pure lighterage stream discharge method which was very susceptible to interruption due to adverse sea conditions. Lighterage will still be used to unload some ships, but the more reliable and faster pier discharge is expected to account for the bulk of the ammunition tonnage. The ammunition pier is now being operated by units of the 10th Transportation Battalion (Terminal). On 8 December the fourth pier was added to the main pier complex. Designated pier number one, the new pier was built by the DeLong Corporation. It is operated by the 565th and 870th Transportation Companies (Terminal Service) of the 10th Transportation Battalion (Terminal).

4. During this quarter, the 165th Transportation Company (Light Amphibian), the 510th Transportation Detachment (Materials Handling, Heavy) and the 540th Transportation Detachment (Heavy Amphibian) were added to the command troop list. All of these units were assigned to the 24th Transportation Battalion (Terminal). The 119th Transportation Company (Terminal Service) and 504th Transportation Detachment (Refrigerator Barge Crew) were transferred to other commands. Organizational structure of this command is shown in the troop list at Annex A.

5. During this quarter a total of 479,491 short tons of cargo were handled by Cam Ranh Bay Port Command units. This includes the record month of January when 133,997 short tons were discharged and 39,571 short tons backloaded for a total of 173,558 short tons handled. This represents an increase of 5907 short tons discharged, 7473 short tons backloaded, and 20,452 short tons handled over the previous record months. Also during this period there were 4042 troops discharged at Cam Ranh Bay.

6. This command began operations in crowded, borrowed building space. Action was taken to construct a new command headquarters. On 29 November the Command moved into its permanent quonset buildings on a hill overlooking the harbor. To date, 3 buildings have been completed and the road leading to the building site and parking lot are almost completed. (The headquarters was among the first operations at Cam Ranh Bay to obtain electrical



service from the Vinnell Corporation power ships.) Upon arrival, headquarters personnel were quartered in tents with wood floors. Since that time, frames have been built, and sideboards and screening have been put up for each tent. A mess hall has been constructed and is in operation in the company area.

## SECTION 2 (COMMANDERS OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS)

### PART I - OBSERVATIONS (Lessons Learned)

#### 1. Personnel.

ITEM: Retraining of senior grade Non-Commissioned Officers.

DISCUSSION: Department of the Army recently instituted a program of shifting and retraining E-6's, 7's and 8's from branches not extensively employed in Vietnam, notably Armor, to Transportation Corps units in order to compensate for a shortage of trained Non-Commissioned in Transportation Skills.

OBSERVATION: Personnel retrained under this program have generally been performing in a highly satisfactory manner. Enough similarity exists in basic NCO-type duties, regardless of the type of unit to which assigned, to allow them to make the transition smoothly and their presence alleviates a major personnel shortage which had formerly resulted in lack of adequate supervision due to shortage of key NCO's. This program has proven its worth and should be continued.

ITEM: Rotational humps and prompt return of personnel at DEROS.

DISCUSSION: Present policy prohibits individuals from departing RVN more than seven days prior to their DEROS. Periodic rotational humps occur, (i.e., one year from the time a unit arrives in country,) and adequate port calls are not available to send all personnel home within the seven day period.

OBSERVATION: Holding personnel beyond DEROS has an adverse effect upon morale and often "snowballs" into a considerable backlog of personnel awaiting port calls. Generally, personnel are considered to be a loss 15 days prior to DEROS and their duties have already been assumed by others. It has been recommended that the local Personnel Services Center be allowed to curtail tours by 15 days or less in order to ease rotational humps and reduce the number of personnel being held past DEROS.

ITEM: Actual vs rated capability of units.

DISCUSSION: Current procedures for requisitioning E-1 through E-6 replacements result in a 15% shortfall. These shortages generate a corresponding decrease in the ability of the unit to perform its TO&E mission. For planning purposes all transportation units are assigned a TO&E-rated capability to perform a given amount of work per 24-hour period.

OBSERVATION: This rating is based upon the assumption that the unit does not have an appreciable shortage of personnel. Personnel shortages in the neighborhood of 15% make these planning factors invalid and adversely effect planning at higher level.

DCS PEX Comment  
CO3 5 Jan 67

ITEM: Republic of Korea trainee cooks.

5 DISCUSSION: This command was assigned a number of Korean cooks to be trained in field sanitation, food preparation and operation of field equipment. It was recommended that they be billeted with unit mess personnel and be placed on a shift roster. Company commanders were skeptical about the program, but it was enforced.

OBSERVATION: The program was very successful in spite of the language barrier. Both Koreans and Americans learned and benefitted. The Koreans were ambitious and quick to learn, thus making a lighter work load per cook and creating a cheerful atmosphere. Also, the Koreans taught the Americans judo during off duty hours.

## 2. Operations.

ITEM: Handling of cargo for transshipment by intracoastal vessels.

DISCUSSION: Items of cargo manifested for Cam Ranh Bay for transshipment to outport areas (interacoastal shipment) was being offloaded in the stream from the ocean-going vessel to lighterage, transferred to trucks at the beach, and then unloaded from the trucks at the intransit storage yard to await further shipment when an intracoastal vessel was available.

OBSERVATION: Efforts are now being made to book large quantities of cargo for transshipment prior to its arrival and to have an intracoastal vessel ready to take the cargo directly from the ship in the stream, thereby eliminating the extra handling and delay involved in using intransit storage.

ITEM: Lack of FM radio equipment for command communications.

DISCUSSION: There are no FM radios authorized for the Transportation Command (Terminal A) suitable for use in a command FM net under TOE 55-131E. This equipment is necessary to allow quick, reliable communication between the Commander and his staff when away from the headquarters area to enable them to effect rapid coordination and to keep the Commander constantly alerted to changing port conditions. These radios would provide an alternate means of communication to usually unreliable telephone circuits.

OBSERVATION: A Modified Table of Organization and Equipment is being submitted by this headquarters requesting that a Command FM capability be established.

ITEM: Rapid ammunition resupply for Phan Rang Air Base.

DISCUSSION: It has often been necessary to resupply the Phan Rang Air Base with several types of ammunition on very short notice and with minimum possible delay.

OBSERVATION: This problem has been alleviated by adopting the RO/RO concept to LST's. The ammunition is loaded in trailers at the Cam Ranh Ammunition Supply Point; the trailers are loaded on an LST and then shipped to Phan Rang. Upon arrival, the trailers are picked up by local trucks and delivered to the air base. The only significant problem that has been encountered in this operation is that trailer landing gears are sometimes not



properly raised prior to removal from LST. The gear is then bent when crossing the humped portion of the LST ramp. The units at Phan Rang have been cautioned to properly raise the gear and this should alleviate the problem.

6

ITEM: Diversion of cargo consigned to ARVN.

DISCUSSION: An inquiry from the ARVN 651st Signal Company Field Depot American Advisor at Nha Trang revealed that 100% of all its requisitioned batteries were being shipped on reefer vessels. While the batteries are manifested and marked for the 651st at Nha Trang, reefer vessels do not call at that port, necessitating delivery to Cam Ranh. At Cam Ranh the only unit having a reefer capability is the US Army Depot. As a result, all of the 651st batteries were being sent to Depot and absorbed in the Depot stocks.

OBSERVATION: Since this headquarters became aware of the problem greater care is being taken to properly identify ARVN consignees and to insure that proper transshipments are made.

ITEM: Programmed cargo analysis.

DISCUSSION: A need was recognized for a detailed breakdown of all cargo destined for Cam Ranh Bay in order to better pre-plan cargo operations and port work load.

OBSERVATION: This problem was solved by the preparation of a Programmed Cargo Analysis Form on each vessel scheduled for Cam Ranh Bay. The information is taken from advance ocean manifests and the breakdown is made by commodity and consignee. Distribution is effected to interested personnel and agencies.

### 3. Training and Operations.

ITEM: Preparation of Transportation Control and Movement Documents.

DISCUSSION: TMA Saigon is the control authority for the MILSTAMP program within Vietnam. However, TMA has not published standard procedures for TCMD completion. As a result, each unit preparing TCMD data has different procedures. Even booking procedures required by TMA at Cam Ranh do not conform to MILSTAMP regulations. This causes inaccuracies and confusion among consignor and consignee alike, not to mention intermediate movement organizations.

OBSERVATION: A MILSTAMP training conference has been announced for the Cam Ranh Bay area for the period 5 to 6 February 1967. This conference will be conducted by representatives from Department of the Army and Defense Supply Agency. Attendance will include personnel from the Port Documentation Branch, the subordinate Battalions and Terminal Service Companies and the US Army Support Command Transportation Movement Agency. Information received during the conference will be used to set up Command Training Classes for TCMD and general MILSTAMP document preparation in an endeavor to standardize documentation preparation.

ITEM: Tonnage report format and procedures.

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DISCUSSION: The report of tonnage handled by Cam Ranh Bay Port complex was being compiled on a weekly basis. This report, because of its weekly nature and restricted scope, did not provide timely and complete information.

OBSERVATION: By the establishment of a daily tonnage report and the elimination of the weekly report, the scope of the information furnished and its value have been greatly enhanced.

ITEM: Prevention of incidents involving US Army and Vietnamese vessels.

DISCUSSION: US Army intracoastal vessels carrying cargo between ports are required to furnish their own security while underway and at beach landing sites in unpatrolled areas. The previous absence of definitive self-defense guidance to boat skippers and vessel masters setting forth "do's and don'ts" resulted in a US Army vessel inadvertently employing US Navy challenge and inspection procedures in attempting to drive off an unidentified junk. The vessel fired across the junk's bow as a warning to stay away, unaware that the Navy uses this procedure to direct Vietnamese boats to approach and prepare for inspection. The situation produced confusion and frustration for both boats. To preclude future similar incidents and possible serious consequences, coordination was effected with USN representatives, and a letter on vessel self-defense procedures was published furnishing explicit guidance to US Army boat crews. (See Annex B)

OBSERVATION: Every effort must be made to prevent unfavorable incidents which may cause a deterioration of relationships between US and Vietnamese. In cases where there is common usage of a facility (e.g., waterways, roads, airspace, motor pools, ports, etc.), there must also be common understanding of the rules and restrictions which apply to its use. Each command should review its responsibilities in this area and cause all user agencies to establish local SOP's as required.

#### 4. Intelligence.

ITEM: Timely receipt of weather forecasts.

DISCUSSION: 48-hour forecasts of weather data had been transmitted by TWX from Saigon with a precedence of "priority". Due to heavy traffic over TWX facilities, this precedence resulted in a 24 - 48 hour delay in receipt, thus limiting the value of the forecast. A request for upgrading the TWX precedence to "immediate" has provided a more timely delivery of the forecast, thus enhancing its value.

OBSERVATION: Weather information is a perishable commodity and its transmission must be expedited. Recipients of weather data should inform the originator if information is not received early enough to be of use. Concurrently, originators should consider soliciting feedback from user agencies to determine the usefulness of their product.

#### 5. Security.

ITEM: Security education program for supervisors having no prior security training.

DISCUSSION: Command Security Programs are required by regulation; however, there are very few supervisors with security experience in Transportation Corps units. A training vehicle was initiated by assigned AIS officers to provide security information on the "small dose" concept to all subordinate units. The vehicle used is a weekly Security Bulletin followed up by periodic staff visits from the S2 section. The bulletin calls attention to existing security requirements and gives references on how to meet them. It also promulgates command security policy. The bulletin is stencilled in sufficient copies for all units, thereby eliminating the necessity for subordinate battalions to reproduce and/or disseminate the information and policies it contains. Battalion S2's have numerous additional duties which often leaves them little time to become fully conversant with all applicable security requirements. The Security Bulletin affords them authoritative guidance on their responsibilities and those of their subordinate companies and detachments. S2 staff visits to the battalions are conducted to insure that requirements are fully understood and implemented.

OBSERVATION: Logistical and other support-type units of battalion size and smaller should be afforded security guidance by the personnel most knowledgeable in that field. It is not enough to simply require that regulations be read and complied with. Command level headquarters should enlist the assistance of intelligence trained personnel to provide "one item at a time" training to supervisory personnel in security positions. Specific requirements should be implemented on a priority schedule rather than expecting units to accomplish all requirements simultaneously. Staff visits from security trained personnel are desirable in order to make on the spot suggestions and corrections, and to provide the necessary impetus to a program which is often side-tracked by others which are of more immediate concern to unit commanders. Security education is a continuous process and each command should utilize the most experienced resources available to insure the program is being effectively carried out at all levels.

## 6. Logistics.

ITEM: Evacuation of equipment for rebuild.

DISCUSSION: Constant evacuation of equipment to out-of-country rebuild centers has created a continuous shortage of mission essential MHE within this command.

OBSERVATION: Vinnell Corporation has accepted a contract to rebuild Quartermaster, Engineer and Ordnance equipment at their facilities at Cam Ranh Bay. It is expected that this will help relieve the acute shortage of MHE in the Cam Ranh Bay area by all but eliminating transportation time to and from rebuild centers in Okinawa and CONUS.

ITEM: Building on sand.

DISCUSSION: When this command arrived in-country, it was decided that the logical place for the headquarters would be on top of a hill overlooking the port area. Construction on the buildings began immediately after leveling the site, neglecting a major factor—to first stabilize the sand. During the monsoon and high wind season, the sand shifted out from under the windward side of the buildings and drifted up to the windows on the leeward side.

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OBSERVATION: Relandscaping the entire area and covering with laterite to hold the sand required many equipment and man hours that would not have been necessary had the hill been stabilized prior to construction.

ITEM: Maintenance in sandy areas.

DISCUSSION: Sand is a continuous problem at Cam Ranh Bay. Because of its finely textured composition, it is able to penetrate most grease seals.

OBSERVATION: The only effective way to combat the sand is to lubricate more thoroughly and more often.

ITEM: Conservation of wood in construction of movie screens.

DISCUSSION: Generally, wood is in short supply and maximum planning is necessary in order to insure that it is used in the most economical way possible. On the other hand, it is necessary to construct movie screens out of wood for the troops.

OBSERVATION: With a little planning, movie screens can be constructed so as to form one side of a building, such as a shower or day room, and thus the wood is made to serve a double purpose.

PART II - RECOMMENDATIONS. None.



## TROOP LIST

AS OF 2 FEBRUARY 1967

	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Phone</u>	<u>Date Arrived in RVN</u>
1.	124th Transportation Command (Tml A)	223/451/410/124 Sw	1 Oct 66
	HHC 124th Transportation Command (Tml A)	260/124 Sw	1 Oct 66
2.	10th Transportation Battalion (Tml)	141/152	23 Sep 65
	HHD 10th Transportation Battalion (Tml)	10th Bn Sw	29 Sep 65
	116th Transportation Company (TS)	354	19 Dec 65
	155th Transportation Company (TS)	136	4 Jun 65
	410th Transportation Company (TS)	447	31 Aug 66
	551st Transportation Company (TS)	187	11 Sep 66
	565th Transportation Company (TS)	153	14 Jul 65
	870th Transportation Company (TS)	213	15 Feb 65
3.	24th Transportation Battalion (Tml)	400/358	21 Jun 66
	HHD 24th Transportation Battalion (Tml)	404/1097th Sw	21 Jun 66
	355th Transportation Detachment (Tanker Crew)		30 Oct 65
	469th Transportation Detachment (USAV Page)		24 Jan 66
	97th Transportation Company (Heavy Boat)	133	31 May 65
	271st Transportation Detachment (65' Tug Crew)		21 May 65
	276th Transportation Detachment (Floating Crane)		27 May 65
	358th Transportation Detachment (100' Tug Crew)		20 Jan 66
	530th Transportation Detachment (Floating Crane, 60 Ton)		1 Oct 66
	532nd Transportation Detachment (Floating Crane, 100 Ton)		1 Oct 66
	123rd Transportation Company (TS)	155	3 Jun 65
	261st Transportation Detachment (MHE Maintenance)		14 Jul 65
	263rd Transportation Detachment (Mobile Crane)		28 Aug 65
	512th Transportation Detachment (Cargo Handling)		1 Oct 66
	587th Transportation Detachment (MHE Team)		26 Apr 65
	165th Transportation Company (LARC)	124th Sw/ask for 264th/ ask for 165th	15 Dec 66
	264th Transportation Company (TS)	416	18 Sep 66
	510th Transportation Detachment (Mat Hdlg Hv)		15 Dec 66
	344th Transportation Company (LARC)	200	3 Jun 65
	253rd Transportation Detachment (Amphibious Direct Support)		30 May 65
	347th Transportation Company (LARC)	241	31 May 65
	159th Transportation Detachment (Amphibious Direct Support)		10 Aug 66
	403rd Transportation Company (TT)	532	18 Oct 66
	458th Transportation Company (LARC)	531	13 Oct 66
	540th Transportation Detachment (LARC) (LX)		29 Nov 66
	1097th Transportation Company (Med Bt)	1097th Sw	31 May 65
	266th Transportation Detachment (J Boat Crew)		23 Sep 65
	486th Transportation Detachment (Reefer Barge Crew)		17 Jan 66
	492nd Transportation Detachment (Reefer Barge Crew)		5 Mar 66



13  
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
CAM RANH BAY PORT  
124TH TRANSPORTATION TERMINAL COMMAND  
APO 96312

AVCA CR-P-2

27 January 1967

SUBJECT: Vessel Self-Defense Procedures

TO: All Vessel Masters

1. US Army vessels should not assume that other vessels will respect any distance limitations except in established harbor anchorages or at US operated piers.

2. US Army vessels will not interfere in any manner with the passage of any other vessel unless specific and obvious hostile actions are initiated by that vessel.

3. Suspicious, dangerous or hostile actions by any unidentified vessel against a US Army vessel will be met by preparing your vessel and crew for possible emergency conditions. Concurrently, you will transmit your exact location (and course, if underway) over the harbor common frequency and indicate your situation, to include a description of threatening vessels.

4. Self-defense procedures will be initiated by the individual in command of the vessel. The sequence of actions below will be followed if time and circumstances permit:

a. Execute an orderly and non-aggressive show of arms, (i.e., posting men and readying weapons). Trigger safeties will be "on", rounds will not be chambered, and weapons will not be pointed toward the unidentified vessel or its personnel.

b. If the vessel continues to indicate potentially hostile or dangerous action, the ship's bull horn will be used to tell the vessel to stay away. The Vietnamese phrase "DI DI" or "CAM LAI GAN TAU" will be used. (Phoenetic pronounciations are "DEE DEE" and "COMM LIE GONN TOW" (rhymes with "chow"). Examples of such situations are if the vessel is preparing to ram, continuing on a collision course, in too close proximity to the anchor line, approaching alongside, etc.

c. If vessel persists in the action in spite of the verbal warning, fire along the waterline with object of sinking or damaging the vessel. Care must be exercised to insure that other persons or property in the vicinity will not be in the line of fire.

Annex B

AVCA CR-P-2

27 January 1967

SUBJECT: Vessel Self-Defense Procedures

d. If the vessel still persists in its actions, selective warning fire will be directed at personnel having weapons or other equipment which might endanger the US Army vessel. 14

e. If the above actions fail to divert the vessel from its course of action, and if the US Army vessel Master determines it to be in the best interests of the security of his crew, his vessel and his cargo, he may direct that his personnel shoot to wound or kill. Return fire is authorized if the US Army vessel is brought under direct fire by another vessel.

5. All vessel Masters will immediately become familiar with the contents of this letter and will insure that all members of their crews are instructed in their self-defense duties. Specific crew duties will be listed in the ship's station bill.

6. Recipients are cautioned that Vietnamese vessels are required to approach US vessels firing across their bow. This procedure is followed by the Navy in challenging a Vietnamese vessel for inspection. Masters will not employ this procedure without complete justification.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: CRB 124th Switch, S2

*Donald L. Smith*  
DONALD L. SMITH  
Major, AGC  
Adjutant

15  
AVCA CR-GO-P (10 Feb 67)

1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January  
1967 (RCS CSFOR-65)


HEADQUARTERS US ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND CAM RANH BAY, APO 96312 24 FEB 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of  
the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

The inclosed Operational Report on Lessons Learned submitted by  
the 124th Transportation Command (Terminal A), adequately reflects the  
activities of that command for the period indicated.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: CRB 231

  
WILLIAM R. JENKINS  
CPT AGC  
ASST AG